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THE RHETORIC HITS THE ROAD: STATE 
CHALLENGES TO THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard * 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
What is it about health reform—about the particular exercise 
of federal power to compel the purchase of health insurance by 
individuals
1
—that has sparked such concerted objection from 
states? Congress has reached deeply into areas of traditional 
state authority on other occasions in recent memory,
2
 without 
similarly provoking a majority of states to file federal lawsuits or 
engage in a multi-front attack to dismantle a validly enacted fed-
eral statute. How has a federal law, which most clearly infringes 
on individual rather than states‘ rights, become the rallying cry 
for a nationwide Tenth Amendment reinvigoration movement? In 
keeping with the 2011 Allen Chair Symposium‘s ―Everything But 
the Merits‖ theme, this essay considers states‘ lawsuits not mere-
ly beyond the merits but even beyond the litigation itself and 
places the litigation strategy in the larger context of other forms 
of state resistance to implementation of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (―ACA‖ or ―Act‖).
3
 
 
 *  Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. J.D., 1999, University of 
Georgia; B.A., 1993, Columbia University. I am grateful to Carl Tobias and Kevin Walsh 
for inviting me to the 2011 Allen Chair Symposium and all of the Symposium participants 
for a stimulating discussion. 
 1. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010). 
 2. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 12, 18, 21, 22, 28, 31, 47, and 50 
U.S.C.) (enlisting state law enforcement to carry out federal law); Violence Against Wom-
en Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001–40703, 108 Stat. 1902, 1902–55 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), invalidated in part by Unit-
ed States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (purporting to federalize crime of domestic vio-
lence); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–7410 (2006) (setting national standards with 
which state standards must comply). 
 3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
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The following discussion provides an update and reanalysis of 
my previously published article, Rhetorical Federalism: The Val-
ue of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, which made 
an affirmative case for the widespread trend of state resistance to 
the then-recently enacted ACA.
4
 In the months just before and af-
ter the ACA was signed into law, a significant number of states 
engaged in various forms of objection, including, but not limited 
to, filing lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the new 
federal statute.
5
 My earlier article focused on five targets of state 
resistance: (1) Medicaid expansion, (2) high-risk insurance pools, 
(3) health insurance exchanges, (4) federal insurance market reg-
ulations, and (5) the individual mandate.
6
 I identified reasons 
why state-based dissent to the ACA should not be disregarded 
simply as partisan sour grapes by ―Obamacare‖ opponents but in-
stead should be considered valuable to the health care decision-
making process and federal-state relations.
7
 
Scholars have struggled to define an overarching model of fed-
eralism
8
 and to justify placing primary authority for regulating 
health care in federal or state hands.
9
 The complexity of the 
health care system and debates over recent federal legislation 
glaringly reveal the futility of such efforts. We are left instead 
 
(codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Reconcil-
iation Education Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
1305 (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 4. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dis-
sent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 111 (2010). 
 5. Id. at 113–17. 
 6. Id. at 132–61. 
 7. Id. at 161–68. 
 8. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 
47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1229–30 (1994); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Un-
cooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258–60 (2009); Edward S. Corwin, The Pass-
ing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1950); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political 
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sover-
eignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 815–16 (1998); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, 
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 933 (1994); Robert 
A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246–49 
(2005); Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459, 459 (1938); Philip 
J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 663, 665–67 (2001). 
 9. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out?: 
Federal Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 
199, 205 (2011); Scott L. Greer & Peter D. Jacobson, Health Care Reform and Federalism, 
35 J. HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 203, 204–08 (2010); Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The 
Positive Case for Centralization in Health Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the 
ACA, 20 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 266, 272–73 (2011). 
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with a theoretically unsatisfying but descriptively accurate 
―muddled federalism,‖
10
 which functions, within pragmatic and 
political limits, to effectuate an array of sweeping health reforms. 
Like my earlier article, this essay traces the various rhetorical 
arguments raised by states in opposition to federal health reform, 
through which states identify different and sometimes conflicting 
federalism values. At times, states frame objections to the ACA in 
structural terms regarding the scope of federal power, noting 
their sovereign interest in retaining control over state legislative 
and administrative functions. Other arguments highlight the im-
portance of diversity and local tailoring of policies to local tastes 
and needs. State opponents also emphasize the underlying pur-
pose of the federalist system in protecting individuals from exces-
sive government intrusion. Nevertheless, states also tacitly 
acknowledge that certain problems are better suited to national 
regulation. I conclude by echoing my earlier suggestion that this 
inevitable muddle, as displayed in the health reform context,
11
 
should be regarded as one of federalism‘s defining strengths. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
We are less than two years away from the effective date of 
some of the most dramatic reforms under the ACA,
12
 including 
operation of health insurance exchanges,
13
 prohibition on health-
status underwriting
14
 and exclusions based on pre-existing health 
conditions,
15
 expansion of Medicaid eligibility,
16
 imposition of em-
ployer penalties,
17
 and the requirement that most Americans 
maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage.
18
 I first 
examined the trend of state resistance to federal health reform 
during the months of heated congressional and public debate 
 
 10. Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 9, at 289 (characterizing the ACA‘s approach as 
―muddled federalism‖). 
 11. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 168. 
 12. See Implementation Timeline, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://healthre 
form.kff.org/Timeline.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Implementation Time-
line]. 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (Supp. IV 2010). 
 14. Id. § 300gg (Supp IV 2010). 
 15. Id. § 300gg-3. 
 16. Id. § 1396a. 
 17. 26 U.S.C. § 4980(H) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (Supp. IV 2010). 
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leading up to the ACA‘s enactment on March 23, 2010.
19
 This es-
say continues that examination at a critical junction, after the 
public and lawmakers have had two years to digest the massive 
legislation, with Supreme Court resolution of constitutional chal-
lenges pending in July 2012 and near complete implementation of 
key reforms scheduled for January 2014. 
Before the ACA was enacted, it certainly made sense for states 
to engage in the policy debate over whether comprehensive feder-
al health reform was needed and, if so, what form it should take. 
States have been active regulators of the health care and health 
insurance markets for much of the nation‘s history.
20
 Broad feder-
al preemption of one area of insurance regulation—namely, em-
ployer health plans—has constrained states‘ ability to regulate 
those plans since the 1970s.
21
 Until the ACA, however, nothing 
other than political opposition at the state level prevented states 
from adopting their own comprehensive health reform laws, such 
as Massachusetts‘s 2006 legislation.
22
 States were also free to en-
act statutes or constitutional amendments prohibiting, at least 
within their own borders, certain types of health reforms, such as 
a public health insurance plan or a mandate that all citizens pur-
chase health insurance, as several states did in the months before 
the ACA was passed.
23
 
After President Obama signed the ACA into law, states contin-
ued to express vigorous opposition through various channels, in-
cluding proposing state legislation purporting to nullify or opt out 
of the new federal health law.
24
 Although the most frequent target 
of proposed state nullification statutes and constitutional amend-
ments was the individual health insurance mandate, states also 
attempted to opt out of new federal requirements on employers 
 
 19. Leonard, supra note 4, at 113, 167–68 (citing Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
26, and 42 U.S.C.)). 
 20. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Can You Really Keep Your Health Plan? The Limits 
of Grandfathering Under the Affordable Care Act, 36 J. CORP. L. 753, 763 (2011) (describ-
ing the history of state regulation). 
 21. See infra notes 139–41 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974). 
 22. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 2006 
Mass. Acts 77 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the General Laws of Mass.). 
 23. Leonard, supra note 4, at 113–14; see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1(Cum. 
Supp. 2011) (―No resident of this Commonwealth . . . shall be required to obtain or main-
tain a policy of individual insurance coverage . . . .‖). 
 24. Leonard, supra note 4, at 113–15. 
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and state regulators.
25
 As a matter of federal supremacy, those 
state laws without question lacked legal effect and force. Similar-
ly, states‘ lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the ACA, 
filed within hours of the Act‘s enactment, seemed to have little 
legal merit. In the early days of the ACA, states also registered 
objection by refusing to cooperate with the federal government in 
implementing particular provisions of the Act. When I wrote pre-
viously, states were vociferously rejecting the federal govern-
ment‘s invitation to establish state high-risk insurance pools, 
which were to be in place just three months after the ACA‘s en-
actment.
26
 
Most commentators dismissed states‘ legislation,
27
 lawsuits, 
and other forms of resistance as mere symbolic acts, political the-
ater, or Tea Party gamesmanship.
28
 While I agreed that the state 
resistance movement largely lacked legal merit, I suggested that 
the rhetoric of state resistance, specifically, invocation of struc-
tural concerns regarding states‘ rights and limits on federal pow-
er, were valuable in their own right.
29
 States‘ tactics did not uni-
versally foster salutary benefits for the federalist system but nor 
were they necessarily damaging to it. I articulated six specific 
values of ―rhetorical federalism‖ derived from state-based dissent 
to the ACA that included: (1) bringing transparency to the im-
plementation process, (2) educating the electorate on discrete is-
sues of the law, (3) expressing minority views, (4) depoliticizing 
the issues, (5) codifying dissent, and (6) highlighting the in-
creased role of government in health care delivery.
30
 With one no-
table exception, the state-based health reform resistance move-
ment continues to promote those values. My suggestion that 
rhetorical federalism could depoliticize the issues and diffuse par-
 
 25. Id. at 113–15, 155; see also Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions Chal-
lenging Certain Health Reforms, 2011, THE NAT‘L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http:// 
www.ncsl.org/?tabid=18906 (last updated Jan. 27, 2012). 
 26. Leonard, supra note 4, at 140–44 (regarding high-risk insurance pools). 
 27. State legislation took various forms, modeled on the American Legislative Ex-
change Council‘s ―Freedom of Choice in Health Care Act.‖ See ALEC’s Health Care Free-
dom Initiative, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/initiatives/health-
care-freedom-initiative/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
 28. Leonard, supra note 4, at 116–18. 
 29. Id. at 117–18 (suggesting that ―[r]ather than dismiss the [state nullification] 
trend, its persistence and pervasiveness warrants consideration‖ and identifying positive 
effects for ―federal-state relations deriving from the federalism objections being voiced by 
health reform opponents‖). 
 30. Id. at 162–68. 
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tisan political fights over the ACA, however, is almost laughable 
given the current climate. Structural federalism objections have 
hardly mitigated the rancor but have become the central, defining 
contention. The rhetoric has indeed hit the road. 
If nothing else, this ongoing project of examining state-based 
resistance confirms my failure as a health reform prognosticator. 
At the time of the previous article, I confessed surprise that Con-
gress managed to pass a comprehensive, sea-changing package of 
health reform legislation.
31
 Now I must admit that I did not ex-
pect the federalism rhetoric animating the health reform debate 
to be accorded serious legal merit. That not just one, but seven, 
separate petitions for certiorari, from four circuit courts, includ-
ing two challenges involving states as plaintiffs, were filed with 
the Supreme Court is remarkable.
 32
 The fact that the case and 
main substantive issue that the Court has agreed to hear involves 
twenty-six states‘ challenges to the scope of federal power to regu-
late individual citizens
33
 is potentially both a stunning endorse-
ment of New Federalism and a novel recognition of enforceable 
Tenth Amendment rights.
34
 
In this essay, I revisit the five previously identified fronts of 
state resistance, providing a two-year update of successes and 
failures. I also describe states‘ new strategies, including request-
ing waivers from various provisions of the ACA, declining or re-
turning federal funding for the ACA implementation, enacting 
state legislation and multi-state compacts purporting to opt out of 
the ACA, and adopting novel litigation postures. Although states‘ 
tactics, in many cases, still stand on shaky legal grounds, the 
rhetoric of federalism has gained better traction than other com-
 
 31. Id. at 113. 
 32. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, ___ S. 
Ct. ___ (U.S. Nov. 30, 2011) (No. 11-679); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 
(6th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, ___ S. Ct. ___ (U.S. July 26, 2011) (No. 11-117); Vir-
ginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, ___ 
S. Ct. ___ (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420); Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of 
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (U.S. 
Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-400). 
 33. See supra note 32; see also Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1282 (ad-
dressing the constitutionality of the individual mandate under commerce power); Bradley 
Joondeph, Handicapping the Questions Presented, ACA LITIG. BLOG (Oct. 10, 2011, 2:30 
PM), http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com/2011/10/handicapping-questions-presented.ht 
ml. 
 34. See infra Part III (describing the existing paradox in individual mandate litiga-
tion). 
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mentators and I initially predicted. Expressions of state re-
sistance resonate deeply, not just in public debate, but also in ju-
dicial opinions. In light of the shifting battleground, I reconsider 
the values of rhetorical federalism. 
III.  FIVE FRONTS OF STATE RESISTANCE 
A.  Medicaid Expansion 
As the ACA provision with the clearest state nexus, Medicaid 
expansion has proven the most impenetrable to state challenges. 
Medicaid is the quintessential cooperative federalism program.
35
 
States voluntarily agree to implement state-based health care 
programs that meet broad federal requirements in exchange for 
federal funding commensurate with state spending on those pro-
grams.
36
 For almost two decades before the ACA‘s enactment, all 
fifty states voluntarily agreed to participate in the cooperative 
federal-state Medicaid program in order to provide health care to 
low-income and other qualified needy individuals.
37
 
The Florida lawsuit brought by twenty-six states, two private 
plaintiffs, and a business organization challenged the ACA‘s ex-
pansion of Medicaid squarely on Tenth Amendment grounds.
38
 In 
particular, the plaintiffs argued that the ACA‘s new requirement 
to extend Medicaid to all children, parents, and childless adults 
under 133% of federal poverty level amounted to coercion, in vio-
lation of judicially recognized limits on federal conditional spend-
ing power in South Dakota v. Dole.
39
 The states‘ Medicaid chal-
lenge was rejected by Judge Roger Vinson,
40
 the Florida federal 
 
 35. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (describing Medicaid as ―a cooperative 
endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating 
States to aid them in furnishing health care to needy persons‖); Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre 
Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 413, 419 (2008) (―Medicaid is a classic example of cooperative federalism 
. . . .‖). 
 36. See 42. U.S.C. § 1396 (2006). 
 37. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 135 & n.159. 
 38. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1240, 1262–64. 
 39. Id. at 1261–62 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)).  In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme 
Court stated that ―[o]ur decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the finan-
cial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion.‖ 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
 40. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. 
Supp. 2d 1256, 1263, 1266, 1269–70 (N.D. Fla. 2011),  aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 648 
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district judge who struck down the ACA in its entirety,
41
 after 
holding the individual mandate unconstitutional.
42
 The Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed Judge Vinson‘s Medicaid ruling,
43
 holding that 
because states continue to have a real choice whether to partici-
pate, the ACA‘s expanded Medicaid eligibility did not amount to 
coercion.
44
 
In particular, the Eleventh Circuit noted that, from its incep-
tion, the Medicaid statute reserved Congress‘s right to alter, 
amend, or repeal the Medicaid Act.
45
 Moreover, the court reasoned 
that states received ample notice of the ACA‘s eligibility changes, 
effectively, four years from the Act‘s enactment—given that the 
federal government will pay all the costs of covering newly eligi-
ble enrollees for the first two years.
46
 The Eleventh Circuit‘s con-
clusion seems well-supported by previous challenges to congres-
sional amendments to Medicaid and similar conditional spending 
acts.
47
 Despite the court‘s reasoning and the absence of a circuit 
split, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the plaintiffs‘ Medicaid 
challenge.
48
 
 
F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 41. Id. at 1304–05. 
 42. Id. at 1298–99. 
 43. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1268. 
 44. Id. at 1267–68. 
 45. Id. at 1267 (―The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this chapter of 
the [Medicaid Act] is hereby reserved to the Congress.‖ (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 46. Id. at 1267–68 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 47. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 22 (1980) (find-
ing the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act created shared re-
sponsibilities between the federal and state governments); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 548, 593–95 (1937) (rejecting the claim that the Social Security Act‘s tax collec-
tion and unemployment benefits distribution infringes on state sovereignty); Helvering v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (explaining the concept of conditional spending power); see 
also Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1267 (discussing the history of Medicaid Act 
amendments); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that ―Medi-
caid is a voluntary program in which states are free to choose whether to participate‖); 
California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding an additional 
Medicaid requirement to cover emergency medical care to illegal immigrants); Oklahoma 
v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 416–17 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the pass through provi-
sion of the Social Security Act was a ―conventional and appropriate‖ use of congressional 
power under the spending clause). In Texas v. Leavitt, the plaintiffs requested for original 
jurisdiction to review Medicare Part D ―clawback,‖ which required states to pay a portion 
of the new Medicare prescription drug benefit. Plaintiffs‘ Reply Brief at 1, Texas v. 
Leavitt, 547 U.S. 1204 (2006) (No. 135), 2006 WL 1491289. The Supreme Court was un-
willing even to hear the challenge, denying the states‘ petition for original jurisdiction. 
Texas, 547 U.S. at 1204. 
 48. See Florida v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-400, ___ U.S. ___, 
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Other than the Florida lawsuit challenging the ACA‘s Medicaid 
expansion, no state has taken the next and obvious step of simply 
declining to participate in the federal program. If the new federal 
requirements are objectionable, states can simply opt out of them. 
No federal law compels state participation, but states receive fed-
eral funding only if they voluntarily agree to establish a state 
Medicaid program in compliance with federal standards.
49
 States 
could choose to provide no public health care to low-income resi-
dents or to establish fully state-administered, state-funded indi-
gent health care programs. Only one state‘s governor and former 
presidential candidate, Rick Perry, in November 2010 blustered 
about the possibility of Texas opting out of Medicaid, but fairly 
quickly backed off of that threat.
50
 
States‘ continued cooperation with federal Medicaid require-
ments or, at least, continued acceptance of federal Medicaid dol-
lars, would, in one view, seem to support the coercion argument. 
Indeed, the plaintiff states argued that the new Medicaid eligibil-
ity requirements are coercive inasmuch as states simply cannot 
afford to decline federal Medicaid funding, no matter how onerous 
the new conditions.
51
 It seems just as plausible, however, that the 
federal government would be hard put to fully fund and operate 
indigent health programs in all fifty states without state coopera-
tion. Given federal dependence on continued state cooperation in 
Medicaid, states should retain some political power to influence 
the debate and shape the Medicaid program going forward.
52
 
Thus far, however, states‘ proposed innovations mostly take 
the form of requesting federal funding with few strings at-
tached—that is, Medicaid block grants.
53
 A similar notion under-
 
2011 WL 5515165, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011). 
 49. 42 U.S.C § 1396a(b) (Supp. IV 2010); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass‘n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 
(1990); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980).  
 50. Texas Gov. Perry Backs Away from Medicaid Dropout Threat, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS (Dec. 4, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/daily-reports/2010/december/04/ 
news-detail.aspx. 
 51. See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. 
Supp. 2d 1256, 1266 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (summarizing states‘ coercion argument), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 52. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 8, at 1266–68 (describing states‘ power 
as ―servants‖ on which the federal government depends to administer federal programs); 
Leonard, supra note 4, at 138 (discussing the Bulman-Pozen & Gerken theory in context of 
the ACA Medicaid resistance). 
 53. See Are Block Grants the Wave of the Future for Medicaid?, 19 ST. HEALTH WATCH, 
Sept. 2011, at 1, 1–3 [hereinafter Block Grants] (discussing states‘ efforts to reform Medi-
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lies Medicaid Section 1115 (―Section 1115‖),
54
 a long-standing, 
pre-ACA provision that allows the Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services to waive certain federal Medicaid requirements or 
provide federal matching dollars for state Medicaid costs that 
otherwise would not qualify.
55
 Section 1115 waivers allow states 
to experiment with alternative approaches to the problem of ac-
cess to health care and tailor their Medicaid programs to particu-
lar state needs.
56
 Over the years, states have received Section 
1115 waivers of varying scope and purpose and have implement-
ed unique Medicaid strategies and programs to varying success.
57
 
The ACA affirms the availability of Section 1115 waivers but pro-
vides additional administrative and congressional oversight, 
somewhat limiting state flexibility.
58
 
Concerned over the expected increased costs of adding millions 
more people to Medicaid rolls in 2014, states have proposed even 
more comprehensive waivers in the form of lump sum payments, 
rather than the current federal percentage-on-the-dollar match.
59
 
 
caid with less federal involvement). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006). 
 55. Id. § 1315(a). 
 56. See Medicaid Waivers and Demonstrations List, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medi 
caid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/Waivers.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 24, 2012) (listing 459 projects); Medicaid Waivers and Demonstration Projects 
Through Map of States, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program 
-Information/By-State/By-State.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (cataloguing all fifty 
states demonstration projects). 
 57. See Block Grants, supra note 53, at 2–3 (describing Tennessee and Oregon exper-
iments); Daniel M. Fox & Howard M. Leichter, State Model: Oregon The Ups and Downs of 
Oregon’s Rationing Plan, Health Affairs, 12 HEALTH AFFAIRS, no. 2, 1996, at 66–67 (dis-
cussing Oregon‘s ―Reform Demonstration‖ for waiving different Medicaid requirements); 
Peter D. Jacobson & Rebecca L. Braun, Let 1000 Flowers Wilt: The Futility of State-Level 
Health-Care Reform, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1173, 1185–86 (2007) (describing Massachusetts‘s 
1996 Section 1115 waiver); Cyril F. Chang, Evolution of TennCare Yields Valuable Les-
sons, MANAGED CARE, Nov. 2007, at 45. See generally Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Med-
icaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 438 (2011) (describing various forms of state waivers, 
including Section 1115 waivers, which ―offer[] the most flexibility and allow[] state exper-
iments‖). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 713 (Supp. IV 2010). 
 59. Mary Agnes Carey & Marilyn Werber Serafini, How Medicaid Block Grants Would 
Work, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 6, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/ 
2011/March/07/block-grants-medicaid-faq.aspx? (describing several state governors‘ de-
mands for Medicaid block grants); Peggy Venable, Medicaid Block-Grant Momentum 
Builds, ODESSA AM. ONLINE (July 14, 2011), http://www.oaoa.com/articles/state-68506-
medicaid-health.html (Texas state director of Americans for Prosperity, advocating for 
state waiver to ―give Texas the opportunity to run our own Medicaid program, tailored to 
the unique needs and priorities of our citizens‖); see also infra note 238 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Health Care Freedom Compacts). 
LEONARD 463 MASTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/2012  1:08 PM 
2012] STATE CHALLENGES TO ACA IMPLEMENTATION 791 
Former Massachusetts governor and Republican presidential 
candidate Mitt Romney‘s economic plan proposed Medicaid block 
grants nationwide.
60
 It may be no coincidence that Massachu-
setts‘s comprehensive state health reform was made politically 
feasible, in large part, by the threatened expiration of that state‘s 
Section 1115 waiver.
61
 States urge that block grants would allow 
them to administer their own Medicaid programs more efficiently 
and better tailored to their residents‘ needs than presently al-
lowed under federal requirements.
62
 Moreover, they note that the 
current conditional funding approach incentivizes cost inflation, 
not cost containment, because the more states spend, the more 
federal matching dollars they receive.
63
 Under a block grant, 
states would receive finite funding and would have an incentive 
to control costs.
64
 
Critics of Medicaid block grants express concern that states 
will undermine the Medicaid safety net by dropping needy people 
from their programs to reduce costs, as infamously occurred un-
der TennCare.
65
 Moreover, experience with the state Children‘s 
Health Insurance Program (―CHIP‖), a block-grant program, 
demonstrates that states struggled to control their budgets and 
required additional federal funding to sustain the programs.
66
 
Concerns about decreased state accountability under federal 
block grants are exacerbated by judicial limits on individual 
causes of action to enforce federal Medicaid requirements against 
 
 60. See Sam Baker, Romney Plan Calls for Medicaid Block Grants, Repeal of Obama 
Health Law, THE HILL (Sept. 6, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/poli 
tics-elections/179725-romney-plan-calls-for-medicaid-block-grants-repeal-of-obama-health-
law. 
 61. Elizabeth A. Weeks, Failure to Connect: The Massachusetts Plan for Individual 
Health Insurance, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1283, 1297 (2007). 
 62. See Carey & Serafini, supra note 59; Huberfeld, supra note 57, at 548–49 (citing 
New York and Massachusetts as examples of successful Section 1115 waivers); Venable, 
supra note 59. 
 63. Carey & Serafini, supra note 59; Huberfeld, supra note 57, at 474–76; Venable, 
supra note 59. 
 64. See Carey & Serafini, supra note 59; Huberfeld, supra note 57, at 572; Venable, 
supra note 59. 
 65. Block Grants, supra note 53, at 1. Matthew Mitchell, noted that Tennessee‘s ex-
pansion of Medicaid resulted in the state ―dramatically draw[ing] back eligibility,‖ and 
―[o]vernight, 200,000 people were dropped from the Medicaid rolls.‖ Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 66. See Huberfeld, supra note 57, at 582 & n.205 (suggesting that states overspent 
federal CHIP allotments, requiring expanding federal funding through program reauthor-
ization). 
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states.
67
 In the past, individual Medicaid enrollees and providers 
could bring § 1983 lawsuits against state authorities to compel 
compliance with federal Medicaid requirements.
68
 Recent judicial 
decisions, however, have severely limited the availability of those 
entitlement claims.
69
 Some courts, while rejecting the § 1983 
cause of action, have allowed individuals to challenge state Medi-
caid policies on federal supremacy grounds.
70
 The viability of 
those challenges is before the Supreme Court this term.
71
 But if 
states are allowed to act freely under block grants without having 
to comply with federal conditions, there would be little basis for 
either a § 1983 challenge or a preemption challenge to potentially 
radical state Medicaid cuts. 
An alternative to block grants, which dissenting states have 
not advocated, is to federalize Medicaid, thereby placing full re-
sponsibility for indigent health care on the federal government.
72
 
The ACA moves in the direction of federalizing the program by 
requiring the federal government to bear the full costs of newly 
eligible Medicaid recipients for the first two years of the pro-
gram‘s expansion and 90% of the cost of new enrollees perpetual-
ly, beginning in 2020.
73
 The generous federal funding for the 
ACA‘s Medicaid expansion, not surprisingly, has drawn no appar-
 
 67. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federal-
ism: A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 297, 305–06, 311 
(1996) (observing that ―eliminating entitlements in connection with a shift to block grants 
moves power away from the people, not just the central government, in order to give that 
power to state government‖). 
 68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (allowing a private cause of action for individuals in-
jured by a state official‘s ―deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by‖ 
federal laws); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass‘n, 496 U.S. 498, 523–24 (1990) (allowing an associa-
tion of hospitals to enforce the Medicaid requirement that states provide reasonable and 
adequate payment to participating providers). 
 69. E.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290–91 (2002) (narrowing the availabil-
ity of a § 1983 cause of action pertaining to the nondisclosure provisions of the Family Ed-
ucational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974). 
 70. E.g., Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509–13 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 71. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 590 F.3d 725, 727 (9th Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted, 131A S. Ct. 992 (2011) (No. 09-958) (challenging state legislation reducing 
Medi-Cal provider payments on supremacy clause grounds); see Sara Rosenbaum, Equal 
Access for Medicaid Beneficiaries—The Supreme Court and the Douglas Cases, NEW ENG. 
J. MED., Dec. 15, 2011, at 2245, 2245–46. 
 72. See Huberfeld, supra note 57, at 435–36; Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 67, at 320 
(―The sensible approach to the Medicaid issue would seem to be for the federal government 
to fund and regulate all Medicaid activities . . . .‖); Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 9, at 282–
84 (discussing the advantages of federalizing Medicaid). 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(y)(1)(A), (E) (Supp. IV 2010). 
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ent state opposition.
74
 But states stop short of simply passing off 
responsibility for Medicaid to the federal government. Why states 
continue to cling to the indigent health care budget and policy 
hot-potato is not entirely clear. The continued grudging coopera-
tion between states and the federal government in Medicaid fund-
ing and administration reveals a sort of dysfunctional functional 
federalism.
75
 While neither partner seems entirely satisfied with 
the level of effort, support, and commitment that the other in-
vests, neither has proposed a radical new approach. 
In the unlikely event that the Supreme Court holds the ACA‘s 
Medicaid expansion unconstitutional, the playing field would be 
dramatically altered. First, Medicaid expansion is expected to ac-
count for more than half, or close to sixteen million of the thirty-
two million newly insured individuals under the ACA.
76
 If Medi-
caid cannot be expanded to cover those individuals, the exchang-
es, commercial insurance market regulations, and other proposals 
would have to be reconsidered and expanded to meet the ACA‘s 
goal of near universal health insurance coverage. Second, numer-
ous existing and new initiatives under the ACA rely on condition-
al spending power.
77
 As a practical matter, any further limitations 
that the Court imposes would restrict Congress‘s authority to 
amend existing programs in which states already participate, or 
to implement new cooperative programs. Finally, any such deci-
sion from the Court would signal a broad shift in the allocation of 
power between the federal government and state governments. In 
sum, although seemingly settled, the Supreme Court‘s grant of 
review leaves the Medicaid front very much still in play. 
 
 74. See Cauchi, supra note 25. 
 75. Cf. David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A 
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1222–23 (2004) (describing functional federalism and examining theory 
in Medicaid context). 
 76. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, 
Speaker, House of Representatives, tbl.2 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov 
/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11355/hr4872.pdf (predicting that by 2019, sixteen million more people 
with be covered by Medicaid and CHIP, above the thirty-five million Americans who cur-
rently receive Medicaid, to reduce the overall number of uninsured by thirty-two million 
people). 
 77. See, e.g., Bradley Joondeph, Big News Is the Medicaid Grant, ACA LITIG. BLOG 
(Nov. 14, 2011, 7:36 AM), http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/big-news-is-med 
icaid-grant.html. 
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B.  High-Risk Insurance Pools 
One of the earliest ACA provisions to be implemented was the 
Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (the ―PCIP‖), aimed at one 
of the most frequent consumer complaints about the health in-
surance industry—the inability of individuals who most need in-
surance to obtain it.
78
 Insurance companies, quite rationally, pre-
fer not to issue policies to individuals with costly, pre-existing 
health conditions. Insurers that are willing to write policies for 
such individuals, absent the loss-spreading advantages of large 
group risk pools, typically charge very high premiums. According-
ly, many individuals diagnosed with grave or chronic illnesses ei-
ther cannot obtain coverage or cannot afford the insurance plans 
offered by the insurance companies.
79
 
Effective 2014, all health insurers participating in the ex-
changes will be prohibited from denying coverage to anyone based 
on health status
80
 and from considering patient-specific factors 
other than individual or family policy, geography, and, to limited 
extents, age and tobacco use, in setting premiums.
81
 Those guar-
anteed issue and community rating provisions, combined with ra-
tionalization and standardization of health insurance markets 
through the exchanges,
82
 are designed to make meaningful, af-
fordable health insurance available to all. In the meantime, how-
ever, people with pre-existing conditions who have been without 
health insurance face the existing market discrimination. Accord-
ingly, the ACA includes a temporary high-risk insurance pro-
gram, or the PCIP, as a stopgap until the crucial 2014 underwrit-
ing restrictions and health insurance exchanges are in place.
83
 
 
 78. See Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Secretary Sebelius 
Announces New Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (July 1, 2010), http://www. 
hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/07/20100701a.html. Secretary Kathleen Sebelius expressed 
concern that ―[f]or too long, Americans with pre-existing conditions have been locked out of 
our health insurance market.‖ Id. 
 79. See generally Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 546 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(describing medical underwriting practices); Robert H. Jerry, II, Health Insurance Cover-
age for High-Cost Health Care: Reflections on The Rainmaker, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1347, 
1365 (1996) (describing insurance industry practices regarding pre-existing health condi-
tions); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Private or Public Approaches to Insuring the Uninsured: 
Lessons from International Experience with Private Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 464 
(2001) (describing experience rating and its effect on premiums). 
 80. 42 U.S.C § 300gg-4(a) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 81. Id. § 300gg(a)(1). 
 82. Id. § 300gg-4(a).  
 83. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH REFORM: QUESTIONS 
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The PCIP was to be in place no later than ninety days after the 
ACA‘s enactment
84
 and guarantees coverage to individuals who 
have a pre-existing condition and have been uninsured for six 
months.
85
 
The ACA placed primary responsibility on the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (―HHS‖), Secretary Kathleen Sebe-
lius, to implement the PCIP but gave her the option of contract-
ing with states and nonprofit organizations to assist.
86
 According-
ly, Secretary Sebelius invited states to cooperate with the federal 
government in establishing and administering the state-based 
PCIPs.
87
 Twenty-seven states elected to operate their own PCIPs 
and receive federal funding.
88
 Twenty-three states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia declined the Secretary‘s offer and allowed the 
federal government to administer the PCIPs in their borders.
89
 
The ultimate federal-state equilibrium did not easily fall into 
place, however. Immediately following the ACA‘s enactment, sev-
eral states took advantage of the Secretary‘s invitation by noisily 
refusing any cooperation with the federal government in imple-
menting the ACA.
90
 Eighteen months later, the rancor died down, 
and the near even split of federal and state PCIPs seems to oper-
ate without debilitating federalism friction. The greatest concern 
and surprise about the PCIPs has been the relatively low uptake 
by potential beneficiaries. Four months after implementation, en-
rollment numbers nationwide remained below 8,000,
91
 perhaps 
 
ABOUT THE TEMPORARY HIGH-RISK POOL 1 (2011); Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Health & 
Human Servs., supra note 78. 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 18001(a) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 85. Id. § 18001(c)–(d). See generally Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 
75 Fed. Reg. 45,014, 45,015, 45,019–20 (proposed July 30, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 152) (The CIP programs ―offer [high-risk] individuals guaranteed access to coverage 
without pre-existing condition exclusion at a standard premium, if they are uninsured for 
at least six months.‖). 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 18001(a)–(b) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 87. See Sebelius Begins Push for High-Risk Pools, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, http://pre 
scriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/sebelius-begins-push-for-high-risk-pools/. 
 88. State by State Enrollment in the Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plan as of Aug. 
31, 2011, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/10/pcip10142 
011a.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Enrollment]. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 141–43 (describing early objections). 
 91. State by State Enrollment in the Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plan Archived 
Enrollment Data, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/02/ 
pcip02102011b.html (last updated Jan. 13, 2012); see also Arthur Delaney, PCIP: Enroll-
ment in High-Risk Pools Inches Up to 12,000, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2011, 12:01 
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due to the public‘s lack of awareness of the program and strict el-
igibility rules. But according to the government‘s August 31, 2011 
report, enrollment had exceeded 30,000 individuals.
92
 
States‘ decisions whether to cooperate with PCIP implementa-
tion does not correspond to their litigant and non-litigant status. 
Among the twenty-eight states suing the federal government over 
the constitutionality of the ACA, thirteen elected to operate state-
based PCIPs, and fifteen allowed the federal government to oper-
ate their PCIPs.
93
 It may seem anomalous for litigant states, urg-
ing the importance of limiting federal power and reclaiming state 
power in their litigation posture, to prefer fully federal operation 
of intrastate insurance pools. As a structural matter, however, 
there is no apparent constitutional problem with parallel state-
federal operation of PCIPs. In my earlier article, I characterized 
the emerging PCIP dynamic as an example of functional federal-
ism.
94
 States have the right not to be commandeered into federal 
service but may voluntarily bargain and contract for use of their 
services.
95
 Accordingly, a bare majority of states accepted the fed-
eral offer while the rest declined. Thus far, the functional federal-
ism approach to the PCIP administration has not impaired feder-
al-state relations and has produced a workable (albeit 
undersubscribed) temporary solution for covering previously un-
insurable individuals. 
C.  Exchanges 
The experience of federal-state cooperation in the PCIP should 
provide useful lessons for the implementation of Health Benefit 
Exchanges,
96
 an intricate set of the ACA provisions that are more 
 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/pcip-enrollment-in-high-risk-pools-inches-
up_n_821871.html (noting that PCIP program has had a slow start). 
 92. Enrollment, supra note 88; see also Enrollment Tops 30,000 in Health Reform’s 
Temporary High-Risk Pool, CCH (Oct. 4, 2011), http://hr.cch.com/news/benefits/100411. 
asp. 
 93. See Enrollment, supra note 88; Ilya Somin, Number of States Challenging the Con-
stitutionality of Obamacare Rises to 28, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 19, 2011, 2:45 
AM), http://volokh.com/2011/01/19/number-of-states-challenging-the-constitutionality-of-o 
bamacare-rises-to-28/; 26 States Join Suit Against Obama Health Law, FOXNEWS (Jan. 19, 
2011), http://foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/18/states-join-obama-health-care-law suit-fla/. 
 94. Leonard, supra note 4, at 143–44. 
 95. See Hills, supra note 8, at 816–17 (describing the ―functional‖ theory of coopera-
tive federalism). 
 96. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (Supp. IV 2010). 
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expansive, longer lasting, and more critical to the ACA‘s overall 
success than the PCIP. The ACA aims to reduce the percentage of 
uninsured Americans to single digits
97
 through expansion of three 
existing channels: (1) employer-sponsored health insurance, (2) 
public health insurance (primarily Medicaid), and (3) the individ-
ual and small group health insurance market.
98
 The exchanges 
are the linchpin to expanding the individual and small group 
markets and will house a variety of regulatory structures and 
substantive requirements making it economically feasible for in-
surers to offer meaningful, affordable products.
99
 
The PCIP and exchanges both leave states a clear option to re-
fuse cooperation with the federal government, thereby shielding 
those programs from ―commandeering‖ challenges.
100
  The PCIP 
operates from the baseline of state autonomy, with the federal 
government having the option to purchase states‘ administrative 
services.
101
 By contrast, the ACA places primary responsibility for 
establishing and administering exchanges on states, with the 
threat of a federal take-over if they do not.
102
 States have until 
January 1, 2013 to demonstrate to the Secretary of HHS that 
 
 97. See Elmendorf, supra note 76 (predicting that by 2019 under ACA, the insured 
share of nonelderly population will be 92%, or 95%, excluding unauthorized immigrants). 
 98. See Barry R. Furrow, Health Reform and Ted Kennedy: The Act of Politics . . . and 
Persistence,  14 N.Y.U. J. LEG‘S & PUB. POL‘Y 445, 445–56 (2011). 
 99. See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: The Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1727, 1755–56 (2011) (describing exchanges as ―a 
central feature‖ of insurance market reforms that ―will promote transparency for consum-
ers‖); Troy J. Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping It Simple: Health Plan Stand-
ardization and Regulatory Choice Under the Affordable Care Act, 74 ALB. L. REV. 241, 
284–93 (2010–2011) (describing the operation of exchanges); see also Creating a New 
Competitive Marketplace: Health Insurance Exchange Establishment Grants Awards List, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/05/exchanges0523201 
1a.html (last updated Nov. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Creating a New Competitive Market-
place] (describing anticipated effects of exchanges on individual and small group insurance 
markets). 
 100. Compare South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210–12 (1987) (upholding a federal 
law conditioning federal highway funds on states enacting laws limiting alcohol sales to 
minors and introducing limits on conditional spending power), and Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil 
Serv. Comm‘n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) (recognizing that the Tenth Amendment does not 
forbid Congress from ―fix[ing] the terms upon which its money allotments to states shall 
be disbursed‖), with Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that federal 
commandeering of state officials violated the Constitution), and New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144. 174–75 (1992) (holding that congressional conditions ―crossed the 
line distinguishing encouragement from coercion‖). 
 101. 42 U.S.C. § 18001(a)–(b) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 102. Id. § 18031(b)(1) (providing that ―[e]ach State shall, not later than January 1, 
2014, establish an American Health Benefit Exchange‖); see Leonard, supra note 4, at 
144–45 (describing different baselines for the PCIP and exchanges). 
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they will have fully operational exchanges up and running in 
January 2014.
103
 The ACA authorizes the Secretary to provide 
grants to states for exchange implementation until January 1, 
2015,
104
 after which time, state exchanges must be self-
sustaining.
105
 If states cannot or will not establish exchanges, the 
federal government will step in and do so for them.
106
 In other 
words, the exchanges allocate federal-state authority as a matter 
of federal preemption, rather than as autonomous contracting 
parties. 
Should states opt to establish state-based exchanges under the 
ACA, they must provide themselves with the necessary legal au-
thority.
107
 At present, over one-third of states have enacted state 
legislation to establish exchanges, and several others, by legisla-
tion or executive order, are continuing to study the feasibility of 
establishing state-based exchanges.
108
 All but one of these states 
accepted modest federal Exchange Planning Grants of up to $1 
million to investigate and research options for creating exchang-
es.
109
 Six states and one consortium of states received substantial 
Early Innovator Grants, ranging from $6 million to $48 million, 
to develop information technology systems to support the ex-
changes.
110
 Ideally, innovator states will develop strategies that 
other states can later adopt.
111
 In January 2011, HHS also an-
nounced the availability of Exchange Establishment Grants, 
which several states subsequently received.
112
 
 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(b) (Supp. IV 2010); see also Establishment of Exchanges and 
Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,866, 41,867 (proposed July 15, 2011) (to be codi-
fied 45 C.F.R. pts. 155–56) (describing the ACA provisions on exchanges). 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 105. Id. § 18031(d)(5)(A). 
 106. Id. § 18041(c)(1). 
 107. Sara R. Collins & Tracy Garber, State Health Insurance Exchange Legislation: A 
Progress Report, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND BLOG (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.common 
wealthfund.org/Blog/2011/Jun/State-Health-Insurance-Exchange-legislation.aspx. 
 108. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ESTABLISHING HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: 
AN UPDATE ON STATE EFFORTS, FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM 1–2 tbl.1 (2011) [hereinafter 
KFF UPDATE]; Collins & Garber, supra note 107. 
 109. KFF UPDATE, supra note 108, at 7. 
 110. States Leading the Way on Implementation: HHS Awards “Early Innovator” 
Grants to Seven States, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/20 
11/02/exchanges02162011a.html (last updated May 7, 2011) [hereinafter States Leading 
the Way]. 
 111. Id.; see also KFF UPDATE, supra note 108, at 7. 
 112. KFF UPDATE, supra note 108, at 8; Creating a New Competitive Marketplace, su-
pra note 99. 
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In August 2011, federal officials concluded that ―the vast ma-
jority of states have already taken the crucial early steps‖ in es-
tablishing state-based exchanges and ―have already expressed in-
terest in applying to future [funding] rounds to build a robust 
Exchange for their residents.‖
113
 The federal government‘s opti-
mism, however, may be overstated. Roughly the same number of 
states that enacted or intend to enact state-based exchanges con-
sidered, but failed to enact, state exchange legislation by July 
2011.
114
 Governors in eight states where legislation failed are con-
sidering alternative ways of establishing exchanges in the face of 
legislative resistance.
115
 Ten other states had not considered legis-
lation even with the January 2013 deadline looming.
116
 
For a time, many states participating in lawsuits challenging 
the ACA‘s constitutionality continued preparations to establish 
state-based exchanges. Close to half of the twenty-eight litigant 
states, including Virginia, have enacted legislation or are actively 
studying the feasibility of state-based exchanges.
117
 Several also 
applied for and received generous federal grants, beyond the rou-
tine Exchanges Planning Grants. Plaintiff states Kansas, Okla-
homa, and Wisconsin were awarded generous Early Innovator 
Grants for approximately $31.5, $54, and $38 million, respective-
ly.
118
 Several months later, however, the Republican governors of 
Kansas and Oklahoma issued prominent statements returning 
the grants to the federal government.
119
 Wisconsin‘s governor also 
made a show of returning $9 million in federal grants, but not the 
 
 113. Creating a New Competitive Marketplace, supra note 99. 
 114. See KFF UPDATE, supra note 108, at 3 (noting that ―there was no [state] legisla-
tive activity on exchanges in 26 states, as of July 2011‖). 
 115. Collins & Garber, supra note 107. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. (including a map showing the ―Status of State Legislation to Establish Ex-
changes, as of January 2012‖); see also HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., State Action To-
ward Creating Health Insurance Exchanges as of Dec. 22, 2011, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=962&cat=17&sub=205&yr=1&typ= 
5&o=a&sortc=1 (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
 118. States Leading the Way, supra note 110. 
 119. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Total Health Insurance Exchange Grants, 2011, 
STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=964&cat 
=17&sub=205&yr=200&typ=4 (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter KFF, Exchange 
Grants] (noting return of grants); Isabel Lyman, Okla. Gov. Fallin Rejects Federal Grant 
for Health Insurance Exchange, THE NEW AM. (Apr. 17, 2011), http://thenewamerican. 
com/usnews/health-care/150-okla-gov-fallin-rejects-federal-grant-for-state-health-insuranc 
e-exchange; Scott Rothschild, Brownback Says State Is Returning to Feds $31.5 Million 
Health Care Reform, GRANT LAWRENCE J. WORLD (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www2.ljworld.com 
/news/2011/aug/09/brownback-says-state-returning-feds-315-million-he/. 
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full $38 million Early Innovator Grant.
120
 Only three litigant 
states—Alaska, Florida, and Louisiana—have refused all federal 
funding related to exchange implementation.
121
 
The range of state responses to the January 2013 exchange 
deadline reveals alternate federalism values and approaches. 
Some states, having failed to prevent the ACA from being enact-
ed, are pursuing a second-best strategy of preventing it from be-
ing effectively implemented by blocking state exchange legislation 
and refusing federal financial assistance. That obstinacy effec-
tively cedes control of exchanges to the federal government, a 
move that contradicts the federalism rhetoric of states‘ rights and 
limited federal powers. One Montana legislator, who opposes the 
ACA and also sought to block state exchange legislation, ex-
plained that as long as a state-based exchange is established un-
der the federal ―mandate,‖ there is ―nothing Montana-made about 
it.‖
122
 Alaska‘s governor Sean Parnell offered a different rationale, 
citing Senior District Court Judge Roger Vinson‘s opinion striking 
down the ACA as the ―law of the land.‖
123
 In Parnell‘s mind, any 
steps toward implementing exchanges would be ―proceed[ing] 
down an unlawful course,‖
124
 despite the fact that Judge Vinson‘s 
 
 120. Igor Volsky, Scott Walker Cuts State Health Services, Then Rejects Health Re-
form’s Public Health Grants, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Aug. 5, 2011, 12:08 PM), http://think 
progress.org/health/2011/08/05/289193/wisconsin-rejects-grants-from-health-law-despite-
cutting-health-services-in-state-budget/; see also Sarah Kliff, Will Wisconsin’s Scott Walker 
Implement Health-Care Reform?, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/ezraklein/post/willwisconsinsscottwalkerimplementhealthcarereform/2011/07/11 
/glQALBOb8l_blog.html. 
 121. See Kevin Sack, Opposing the Health Law, Florida Refuses Millions of Dollars, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2011, at A10; KFF, Exchange Grants, supra note 119 (summarizing 
total federal grants to states and noting those three states did not receive a federal grant); 
Yereth Rosen, Alaska Won’t Seek U.S. Health Exchange Grants, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/18/us-alaska-healthcare-idUSTRE71H0UC201102 
18. 
 122. Sarah Kliff, Tea Party Notches Health Reform Wins, POLITICO (Mar. 30, 2011, 1:32 
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/52231.html. Discussing the resistance es-
tablishing state-based exchanges, Michael Cannon, director of health policy studies at the 
Cato Institute, stated that ―[t]here remains an inherent contradiction where you have gov-
ernors saying they think Obamacare is unconstitutional but [are] also trying to implement 
the law.‖ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123. Althea Fung, Alaska Governor Refusing to Apply for Exchange Grants, NAT‘L J. 
(Feb. 18, 2011), www.nationaljournal.com/member/healthcare/alaska-governor-refusing-to-
apply-for-exchange-grants-2011-2-18?mrefid=site_search (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (citing Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. 
Supp. 2d 1256, 1304–05 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 648 F. 3d 1235 
(11th Cir. 2011)). 
 124. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).  
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decision was binding only in the Northern District of Florida and 
only until overturned by the Eleventh Circuit.
125
 
Other states have followed a more pragmatic strategy of simul-
taneously challenging the constitutionality of the ACA while tak-
ing affirmative steps toward establishing state-based exchanges, 
thus hedging their bets in the event that the lawsuits are unsuc-
cessful. The preference for state-based, rather than federally op-
erated, exchanges strikes a more consistent ideological posture 
regarding states‘ traditional powers to regulate health care and 
health insurance under the Tenth Amendment. To that end, Ok-
lahoma‘s governor and legislative leaders plan to move forward 
with establishing a state-based exchange solely with state and 
private dollars.
126
 Similarly, Colorado has touted its bipartisan 
health insurance exchange and decision not to opt out of the ACA 
implementation.
127
 Wisconsin applied for its Early Innovator 
Grant
128
 under former Democratic Governor Jim Doyle, holding 
itself out as technical expert and leader for state-based health 
care programs.
129
 Even under the current Republican governor, 
Wisconsin has not returned the Early Innovator Grant and main-
tains a prototype Wisconsin Health Insurance Exchange web-
site.
130
 
The lack of a unified response to exchanges implementation 
among states opposing the ACA suggests the array of values that 
federalism encompasses, more than incoherence in states‘ strate-
gies. Like the PCIP implementation, states‘ litigation postures do 
not necessarily align with their varying preferences for exchange 
implementation. Yet both the pragmatic and obstinate strategies 
are grounded in the federalism rhetoric. Some states take offense 
at any federal requirements being imposed on states and, there-
 
 125. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1304–05 (striking down the ACA 
in its entirety after finding the individual mandate unconstitutional); 648 F.3d at 1323 
(holding that the district court erred in invalidating the ACA). 
 126. See Lyman, supra note 119 (―The intent is to satisfy ObamaCare‘s requirement of 
establishing an exchange, and do it with state and private dollars.‖). 
 127. Nancy Lofholm, Colorado Stands Against Anti-Health-Reform Tide, DENV. POST, 
Nov. 3, 2010, at B2. 
 128. Wisconsin a Model for Creating Healthcare Insurance Exchanges, ALTER CARE 
BLOG (Apr. 12, 2011, 11:52 AM), http://www.altergroup.com/alter-care-blog/index.php/hea 
lthcare/wisconsin-a-model-for-creating-healthcare-insurance-exchanges/. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See generally WISCONSIN HEALTH INS. EXCHANGE, https://exchange.Wiscon sin.gov 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (proving information regarding the Wisconsin Health Insur-
ance Exchange). 
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fore, refuse any cooperation with exchange implementation.
131
 
Other states appear more troubled by the notion of federal au-
thorities taking over state functions and, therefore, take steps to 
ensure state control of exchanges and avoid federal preemption.
132
 
The intermingling of federal and state exchange implementa-
tion demonstrates familiar federalism values of voice, diversity, 
and exit.
133
 Rather than a one-size-fits-all approach, states are ex-
ploring alternative funding, legislation, and coordination strate-
gies. States may satisfy diverse tastes and priorities through a 
choice of fully federal, fully state, or cooperative federal-state 
strategies.
134
 Indeed, the choice between a national exchange and 
state-based exchanges was exhaustively vetted through the polit-
ical process in congressional debates, with the latter carrying the 
final vote.
135
 Critics of state-based exchanges nevertheless raise 
practical concerns about some states‘ risk pools being too small 
for exchanges to operate effectively and the qualified success of 
existing pre-ACA state exchanges.
136
 More to the point of this es-
say, commentators fault the ―state-centric framework‖ for creat-
ing an ongoing opportunity for states to obstruct implementation 
and perpetuate political battles.
137
 The preceding description un-
doubtedly confirms that dynamic but does not compel the norma-
tive conclusion that it necessarily is a bad thing. That sort of fric-
tion and jarring, which ―promot[ed] deliberation and circum-
spection,‖ was part of the Framers‘ design.
138
 Although the system 
of health insurance exchanges ultimately implemented by the 
states and the federal government may be different from 
 
 131. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 112–13, 134; Kliff, supra, note 122. 
 132. See Bailey McCann, Nebraska, Ohio Push Forward on Insurance Exchanges De-
spite Opposition, CIVSOURCE (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.civsourceonline.com/2012/01/06/ 
nebraska_ohio_push_forward_on_insurance_exchanges_despite_opposition/. 
 133. See Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 9, at 276–78; see also Leonard, supra note 4, at 
121 & nn.57–59 (providing further discussion on the values of voice, diversity, and exit-
rights). 
 134. See Adler, supra note 9, at 203–07 (emphasizing the importance of matching poli-
cies with local tastes, preferences, and economic conditions). 
 135. Leonard, supra note 4, at 145. Compare America‘s Affordable Health Choices Act 
of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 208(a)–(b) (2009) (discussing the federal requirements 
states must meet to opt-in and operate their own exchanges), with Affordable Health 
Choice Act, S. 1679, 111th Cong. §§ 3105(a), 3106(e)(1)–(2) (2009) (enacted) (creating a 
state-based exchange). 
 136. Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 9, at 293–94. 
 137. Id. at 291–92. 
 138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
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Congress‘s vision or single-payer adherents‘ preferences, at least 
it will be a system with which most participants can live.
139
 
It remains to be seen how credible the federal government‘s 
preemption threat will be in the face of pervasive state re-
sistance.
140
 If the federal government cannot marshal sufficient 
financial and administrative resources to overcome states‘ re-
sistance to implementing exchanges, the response could threaten 
the overall success of the ACA. Or, states‘ uncooperativeness 
could force a change in policy.
141
 But if state-based and federally 
operated exchanges can comfortably coexist as ―marble cake‖ al-
ternatives,
142
 like the PCIP, then state resistance may have little 
effect in altering the path of federal health reform. 
D.  Federal Insurance Market Regulations 
In my previous article, I included the ACA‘s federal health in-
surance market regulations among the targets of state re-
sistance.
143
 The lack of resistance to the ACA‘s significant reallo-
cation of authority to the federal government to regulate in an 
area of traditional state concern was particularly notable.
144
 
Health care and health insurance regulation has long been the 
primary domain of states.
145
 The federal government‘s previous 
 
 139. See Adler, supra note 9, at 202–03 (noting that ―among competing values and in-
terests for which there is no single ‗right‘ answer . . . a decentralized system will result in 
greater net satisfaction of individual policy preferences than will a uniform federal sys-
tem‖). 
 140. Hills, supra note 8, at 868 (describing the federal-state dynamics of conditional 
preemption and noting that ―Congress is constrained by its limited regulatory capacity . . . 
[and] cannot obtain the condition unless it can make a credible threat of preemption‖). 
 141. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 8, at 1266–67 (―One main source of the 
servant‘s power is dependence, [and] . . . . [s]tates similarly wield power against a federal 
government that depends on them to administer its programs.‖). 
 142. See MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES, Part II, 60–153 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1984) (1966) (discussing ―layer 
cake‖ and ―marble cake‖ federalism models). 
 143. Leonard, supra note 4, at 150–55. 
 144. See id.; see also Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human 
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1302–07 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding insurance and health care to be 
areas of traditional state concern). 
 145. Id. at 1305; Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 619, 644 (1994) (―[B]efore ERISA state law was viewed as the primary source of 
standards for plans.‖); Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Re-
form: Opportunities and Limits, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPP.) 88, 89 (2009) 
(―Traditionally, states are responsible for regulating health care delivery, and litigation 
against health care providers is resolved under state law.‖); Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D. 
Kinney, The Road Paved with Good Intentions: Problems and Potential for Employer-
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intrusion into health insurance regulation, specifically directed at 
employer-based health insurance plans through the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (―ERISA‖),
146
 is largely an 
empty letter in terms of real, substantive regulation.
147
 ERISA in-
fringes on state authority by broadly preempting affirmative 
state regulation of employer health insurance but imposes few 
specific requirements on health plans, much less on states.
148
 The 
ACA, by contrast, adds an extensive new overlay of federal regu-
lations applicable to employer-based health insurance plans as 
well as individual and small group plans, which historically were 
regulated by states.
149
 The ACA‘s health insurance market regula-
tions apply uniformly nationwide, thus limiting the space for 
state variation. States may continue to regulate health insurance 
plans and health insurers as long as state laws supplement and 
do not conflict with the ACA.
150
 
Many of the new federal health insurance regulations have 
broad popular support
151
 and are aimed at some of the most objec-
tionable practices by commercial insurers, including pre-existing 
condition exclusions,
152
 premium discrimination,
153
 post-claims 
underwriting and rescission
154
 and annual and lifetime benefits 
caps.
155
 New federal laws that prohibit or severely limit those 
practices take effect in 2014, the same effective date as the ex-
 
Sponsored Health Insurance Under ERISA, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 29, 33 (1999) (noting that 
states‘ inherent police powers include the authority to regulate insurance). 
 146. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) 
(2006) (providing that federal law preempts ―any and all State laws insofar as they may 
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan‖); see also id. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (provid-
ing a civil action as the exclusive remedy for benefits disputes). 
 147. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insur-
ance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL‘Y L. & ETHICS 23, 29 (2001) (―The result of this statutory 
framework is to leave employment-based health insurance effectively unregulated, since 
ERISA contains no substantive regulation of health benefits.‖); Jacobson, supra note 145, 
at 89 (noting that ERISA provides ―minimal federal regulation‖). 
 148. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 147; Leonard, supra note 4, at 152–53. 
 149. See Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Plural-
ism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1884–87 
(2011). 
 150. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (Supp. IV 2010) (―Nothing in this title shall be construed 
to preempt any state law that does not prevent the application of this title.‖). 
 151. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE—A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF REFORM EFFORTS IN THE U.S. 1 (2009). 
 152. 42 § U.S.C. 300gg-1 (Supp. IV 2010) 
 153. Id. § 300gg. 
 154. Id. § 300gg-12. 
 155. Id. § 300gg-11. 
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changes and the individual mandate.
156
 Other coverage and un-
derwriting requirements, including the ban on pre-existing condi-
tion exclusions for children,
157
 extension of dependent child cover-
age up to age twenty-six,
158
 and coverage of preventive services 
without cost-sharing,
159
 took effect in 2011.
160
 The ACA also at-
tempts to rein in insurance companies‘ excess profits, executive 
compensation, and other largess by limiting non-medical, admin-
istrative expenditures to specified percentages of premium reve-
nues.
161
 This so-called Medical-Loss Ratio (the ―MLR‖) provision 
also took effect in 2011.
162
 
Given the popularity of those reforms among the general pub-
lic,
163
 it is not surprising that ACA opponents have not expended 
much political capital fighting them. But as a structural matter, 
the lack of resistance to federal health insurance market regula-
tion seems inconsistent with states‘ objection to the expansion of 
federal power and intrusion on areas of traditional state authori-
ty. As 2014 nears, states have begun to gently push back against 
uniform federal standards and requirements, seeking to tailor 
certain insurance regulations to their particular markets. So far, 
states have not taken the Obama Administration‘s invitation to 
opt out of the ACA‘s insurance market regulations entirely and 
design unique, state-specific approaches.
164
 
The only significant state resistance to federal health insur-
ance regulation has come in the form of requests for waivers from 
the MLR. Effective January 2011, health insurers are required to 
meet certain MLR targets.
165
 Insurance companies must spend 
 
 156. Implementation Timeline, supra note 12. 
 157. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3. 
 158. Id. § 300gg-14. 
 159. Id. § 300gg-13. 
 160. Implementation Timeline, supra note 12. 
 161. 42 U.S.C. § 300-18. 
 162. Implementation Timeline, supra note 12. 
 163. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW POPULAR IS THE IDEA OF REPEALING 
HEALTH REFORM? 2–3 (2010) (describing polling results revealing that even among re-
spondents who favor repealing ACA, many favor keeping particular provisions, including 
guaranteed issue, the PCIP, dependent child coverage, and exchanges); Reed Abelson et 
al., Major Changes in Health Care Likely to Last, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at A1 (noting 
provisions of health reform that ―are already well cemented and popular‖). 
 164. See 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (Supp. IV 2010) (―Waiver for State Innovation‖); Applica-
tion, Review, and Reporting Process for Waivers for State Innovation, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,553 
(proposed Mar. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 33 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 155). 
 165. Implementation Timeline, supra note 12. 
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80% (in the individual and small group market) or 85% (in the 
large group market) of premiums on direct patient care and qual-
ity improvement.
166
 Only 15% or 20%, of premium revenues, de-
pending on the market, may be spent on non-claims costs, includ-
ing administrative expenses, overhead, executive salaries, and 
marketing.
167
 Health plans that do not meet the targets must pro-
vide rebates to their customers, effective January 1, 2012.
168
 
Several state insurance commissioners expressed concern 
about the effect of the MLR on local markets. In particular, 
smaller insurance companies might have difficulty meeting the 
20% requirement as quickly as the ACA required, which could 
cause those companies to stop offering policies or leave the mar-
ket altogether.
169
 Alternatively, insurers might try to comply with 
the MLR targets by decreasing brokers‘ commissions, thereby 
causing brokers to leave the market.
170
 In either case, the effect 
would undermine the availability of insurance, contrary to the 
ACA‘s goal of expanding health insurance coverage. In response, 
the Secretary of HHS adopted a regulation allowing states to re-
quest waivers from the MLR ―if there is a reasonable likelihood 
that application of the requirement‖ will destabilize the individu-
al health insurance market in the state.
171
 Seventeen states, in-
cluding several litigant states, requested MLR waivers, ranging 
from 65% to 75%.
172
 The Secretary approved, with modifications, 
 
 166. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (Supp. IV 2010); see also Dep‘t of Health & 
Human Servs., Health Insurance Issues Implementing Medical-Loss Ratio (MLR) Re-
quirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule, 75 
Fed. Reg. 74,864, 74,901 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 158). 
 167. 42 U.S.C. § 300-gg-18(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 168. Id. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A); Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ra-
tio (MLR) Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. 
Reg. at 74,883. 
 169. Carrie Teegardin, Feds Give Georgia Insurers More Time to Comply with Health 
Care Law, ATLANTA-J. CONST., Nov. 9, 2011, at A1; Karoun Demirjian, Nevada Secures 
Partial Waiver from Federal Health Care Law, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 16, 2011), http:// 
www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/may/16/nevada-secures-partial-waiver-federal-health-
care-/; Jason Millman, Another State Wants Healthcare Reform Waiver, THE HILL (Mar. 
19, 2011, 4:48 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-reform-implementation/ 
150819-another-state-wants-health-reform-waiver; Margaret Dick Tocknell, Understand-
ing MLR Waiver Requests, HEALTH LEADERS MEDIA (Jul. 27, 2011), http://www.healthlead 
ersmedia.com/content/HEP-269094/Understanding-MLR-Waiver-Requests.html. 
 170. See Jonathan Block, GAO: Insurers Cut Broker Commissions to Comply with Med-
ical Loss Ratio Rules, AIS HEALTH (Sept. 5, 2011), http://aishealth.com/archive/nhpw 
090511-02. 
 171. 45 C.F.R. § 158.301 (2011). 
 172. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Medical Loss Ratio Adjustments, 2011, 
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six states‘ waivers for 2011, including four litigant states.
173
 Re-
sisting states tout those ―partial waivers‖ from the ACA as in-
cremental victories in an overall strategy of undermining the fed-
eral reforms.
174
 
The ACA allows much broader state waivers from ―all or any 
requirements‖ of significant portions of the statute, including the 
individual mandate, health insurance exchange implementation, 
employer penalties, essential health benefits, and the obligation 
to distribute federal subsidies for individuals and tax credits for 
businesses to help purchase insurance.
175
 Section 1332 waivers 
are available beginning January 1, 2017
176
 and are subject to the 
Secretary‘s approval.
177
 Less than a year after the ACA was en-
acted, President Obama endorsed a bipartisan amendment that 
would fast-track Section 1332 waivers three years earlier, allow-
ing states to obtain waivers as soon as January 1, 2014.
178
 The 
President touted the Section 1332 waiver provision and his sup-
port for a shorter timeframe in his February 2011 address to the 
National Governors Association.
179
 So far, however, only a few 
states—and no litigant states—have submitted such proposals. 
The most prominent Section 1332 proposal came from Vermont in 
 
STATEHEALTHCAREFACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=90& 
cat=17 (listing Georgia, Iowa, Maine, and Nevada) (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Demirjian, supra note 169 (noting that Republicans claim waiver ―as a politi-
cal victory‖ and ―fresh fodder for an acrimonious debate about health care‖). 
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (Supp. IV 2010). 
 176. Id. § 18052(a). 
 177. Id. § 18052(a)(1)–(2) (listing the ACA requirements subject to waiver); see Kathe-
rine Hayes & Sara Rosenbaum, Waivers for State Innovation, HEALTH REFORM GPS (Mar. 
21, 2011), http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/waivers-for-state-innovation/ (listing 
the essential health benefit requirement, exchanges, premium assistance, employer re-
sponsibility, and the individual mandate among waivable requirements). 
 178. Sarah Kliff, Some States Seek Flexibility to Push Health-Care Overhaul Further, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2011, at A3; Meredith Hughes, Health Reform Flexibility and the 
Wyden-Brown Waiver for State Innovation, BIPARTISAN POL‘Y CTR. (Mar. 4, 2011), http:// 
www.bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/2011/03/health-reform-flexibility-and-wyden-brown-waiver-
state-innovation; Preparing for Innovation: Proposed Process for States to Adopt Innovative 
Strategies to Meet the Goals of the Affordable Care Act, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.hea 
lthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/03/stateinnovation03102011a.html (last updated Nov. 
16, 2011) [hereinafter Preparing for Innovation]. 
 179. Press Release, Bernie Sanders, U.S. Senator for Vt., President Endorses State 
Waiver Proposal (Feb. 28, 2011), http://sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/news/?id=44a664de-
8e92-43f4-a871-d26e0b5a252d; see Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Kevin Sack, Altering Stand on 
Health Law, Obama Offers Waiver Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at A1; see also Pre-
paring for Innovation (describing proposed waiver regulations as ―[b]uilding on President 
Obama‘s commitment to give states the flexibility to innovate and implement health care 
solutions that work best for them‖). 
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May 2011.
180
 Its state legislature approved a single-payer health 
plan for the state and is working with the federal government to 
obtain necessary waivers.
181
 Other states, including Oregon and 
Montana, have indicated intent to apply for more modest waivers 
to overhaul physician payment and to allow public employees to 
enroll in Medicaid.
182
 
The ACA‘s invitation for broad state flexibility has been 
spurned by some of the most vocal opponents of federal health re-
form. Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin charged that the federal 
requirements to receive a waiver are too onerous.
183
 Kansas Gov-
ernor Sam Brownback said that flexibility ―is a positive thing‖ 
but ―doesn‘t change the overall objection to the bill.‖
184
 Senator 
Orrin Hatch of Utah calls the waiver provision a ―gimmick.‖
185
 
South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley vowed to start crunching 
numbers to come up with a waiver proposal, concluding, ―This is 
about saying we‘re going to fight this every step of the way and 
use every option possible.‖
186
 Thus far, however, no South Caroli-
na Section 1332 proposal has materialized.
187
 Implementing regu-
lations specify that states may qualify for Section 1332 waivers 
only if they can demonstrate their waiver plans will be ―at least 
as comprehensive‖ as the exchanges with ―coverage and cost shar-
ing protections‖ that are ―as least as affordable‖ as the ACA.
188
 
States also must demonstrate their plans ―will provide coverage 
to at least a comparable number of [state] residents‖ as the ACA 
 
 180. Kliff, supra note 178. 
 181. Id.; see also Press Release, Bernie Sanders, supra note 179. 
 182. Governors Push the Limits of Health Reform: Innovate State Leaders Hit Road-
block with Health Reform Waivers, THE DAILY BRIEFING (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.advi 
sory.com/Daily-Briefing/2011/10/18/Democratic-governors. 
 183. See Hughes, supra note 178. 
 184. KHI News Service, Obama Tells Governors He Backs Accelerated State Flexibility 
for Health Reform, KAN. HEALTH INST. (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.khi.org/news/2011/feb/ 
28/obama-tells-governors-he-backs-accelerated-state-f/ (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 185. See Hughes, supra note 178 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 186. Seanna Adcox, Haley: Obama Might Let South Carolina Opt Out of Health Care, 
POST & COURIER (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2010/dec/02/haley-
obama-might-let-sc-opt-out-of-health-care/ (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 187. Cf. THE DAILY BRIEFING, supra note 182 (listing Democratic governors who have 
proposed Section 1332 waivers). 
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(A)–(B) (Supp. IV 2010); see also Application, Review, and 
Reporting Process for Waivers for State Innovation, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,553, 13,561 (proposed 
Mar. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 33.108(a)(2)(iv)(C)(1), (4)) (listing and explain-
ing the application conditions). 
LEONARD 463 MASTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/2012  1:08 PM 
2012] STATE CHALLENGES TO ACA IMPLEMENTATION 809 
and ―will not increase the Federal Deficit.‖
189
 In effect, states may 
obtain waivers only if they can develop their own strategies to 
achieve the same coverage, consumer protection, and cost-
containment goals as the comprehensive federal legislation. 
States‘ relatively modest objections to a new swath of federal 
insurance market regulations and their unwillingness to innovate 
fully state-based solutions suggests federalism ambivalence. The 
ACA imposes a thick overlay of new federal rules and standards 
for health insurance plans, including small group and individual 
plans that traditionally have been regulated by states.
190
 Despite 
the expansion of federal authority into state domain, states seem 
disinclined to challenge new federal laws that have broad popular 
appeal. States seeking modest MLR waivers cite policy objectives 
consistent with the ACA, namely ensuring access to health insur-
ance in certain markets.
191
 No litigant states have proposed com-
prehensive state innovation under the ACA Section 1332 waiv-
ers.
192
 The ACA‘s goals of providing near universal access to 
meaningful health insurance coverage and high-quality health 
care while containing escalating health care costs are daunting. 
States are understandably reluctant to attempt similar broad re-
form without federal involvement. National regulation of health 
insurance offers advantages of scale, uniformity, spillover avoid-
ance, and redistribution.
193
 Insurance markets present unique col-
lective action problems that may not be well-suited for state-by-
state regulation.
194
 Although opposing expansion of federal au-
 
 189. 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(C)–(D) (Supp. IV 2010); Application, Review, and Report-
ing Process for Waivers for State Innovation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,561. 
 190. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text. 
 191. Letter from Jane L. Cline, President, Nat‘l Ass‘n Ins. Comm‘rs, to Kathleen Sebe-
lius, Sec‘y Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 27, 2010), available at http://www.Naic. 
org/documents/committees_ex_mlr_reg_asadopted.pdf. 
 192. Cf. THE DAILY BRIEFING, supra note 182. 
 193. See Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 9, at 271–72 (noting the lower per-unit cost of 
regulation at the national level, ease of compliance for companies operating in more than 
one state, avoidance of regulatory distortion, and redistribution of resources among 
states). 
 194. See Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits that the Minimum Coverage Provi-
sion Respects, 27 CONST. COMMENT 591, 605–08 (2011) (discussing free rider and adverse 
selection problems in insurance markets that spill over state boundaries and thereby justi-
fy federal regulation); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Health-Care Reform, 
YALE L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 22–26), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1856506 (listing citizens‘ concerns about travel and 
mobility, imposition of unequal financial burdens on states, and race to the bottom con-
cerns with individual state regulation of insurance). 
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thority in principle, states may pragmatically recognize that, for 
particular problems, centralized solutions may better achieve the 
interests and aims of their citizenry. 
The fact that the ACA opponents are nuanced enough to recog-
nize that federal regulation offers certain advantages and do not 
feel compelled to fall on their state autonomy sword reveals a 
strength rather than a weakness of ―muddled‖ federalism. The 
problems facing the U.S. health care system are complex and 
multifaceted. There is no reason to expect that either an all-
federal or all-state-based approach would achieve the entire 
range of objectives. The federalist structure, by design, allows 
that some problems are best addressed centrally while others are 
better suited to local solutions. 
E.  Individual Mandate 
The centerpiece of state-based dissent to federal health reform 
continues to be the ACA‘s ―minimum essential coverage‖ re-
quirement, better known as the individual mandate.
195
 Before the 
ACA was passed, over forty state legislatures entertained Health 
Care Freedom Acts (―HCFAs‖) purporting to protect their citizens 
and residents from any requirement to purchase or maintain in-
dividual health insurance.
196
 Twenty-eight states are parties to 
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the individual man-
date.
197
 Even after the ACA‘s enactment, state legislators continue 
to introduce HCFAs and similar legislation or constitutional 
amendments,
198
 despite the undeniable federal supremacy of the 
ACA. Another novel strategy used by the ACA opponents is the 
 
 195. 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (Supp. IV 2010) (requiring every U.S. citizen, other than those 
falling within specified exceptions, maintain a minimum level of health insurance cover-
age for each month beginning in 2014); see also 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010) (impos-
ing a federal tax penalty for noncompliance). 
 196. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 113–15, 159. 
 197. Lyle Denniston, Health Care Case Advances in Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 19, 
2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/health-care-case-advances-in-court/; 
see also Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 
1235 (11th Cir. 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011); 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. 
611-cv-00030-RAW (E.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint, Oklahoma ex rel. 
Pruitt]. 
 198. See Cauchi, supra note 25. 
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proposal of interstate health compacts,
199
 as if states could agree 
among themselves to override conflicting federal law. 
1.  Litigation Posture 
The individual mandate, above all other fronts of the ACA re-
sistance, is the states‘ rights rallying cry, despite the provision‘s 
tangential connection with federal-state allocation of power. The 
individual mandate requires nothing of states.
200
 It is enacted un-
der federal law, carries a federal tax penalty for noncompliance,
201
 
and will be enforced by federal authorities.
202
 To be sure, there are 
plausible individual rights objections to the requirement to pur-
chase health insurance from a private company, including inter-
ference with autonomous health care decision making and free-
dom of contract. But those claims, even if judicially cognizable, 
would garner only low-level rational relation scrutiny, which the 
individual mandate could likely withstand.
203
 
Instead, the strongest constitutional argument against the in-
dividual mandate is structural, not substantive. Both individual 
and state litigants have alleged that the individual mandate ex-
ceeds the scope of federally enumerated powers, namely the tax-
ing and commerce powers.
204
 The Commerce Clause challenge, in 
particular, directly tests the limits of enumerated federal powers 
against states‘ reserved Tenth Amendment powers. The lawsuits 
allege that an individual‘s lack of health insurance does not con-
 
 199. See Some States Pursue Health Compacts, Affordable CARE ACT: ST. ACTION NEWS 
(Nat‘l Conference of State Legislatures, Washington, D.C.), June 3, 2011, at 2. 
 200. Health insurance exchanges are required to certify individuals as exempt from the 
individual mandate. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4)(H) (Supp. IV 2010). Accordingly, if states 
elect to operate their own exchanges, they would be required to perform that function. 
 201. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c) (Supp. IV 2010) (providing federal income tax penalty). 
 202. Id. § 5000A(g) (specifying federal enforcement). 
 203. See Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insur-
ance, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (Special Supplement) 38, 44–47 (2009) (considering the indi-
vidual rights claims); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Safeguarding the Safeguards: The ACA Litiga-
tion and the Extension of Structural Protection to Non-Fundamental Liberties, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4–6) (explaining ―that, in most scholars‘ view, the 
individual mandate simply does not infringe liberty—at least not in any constitutionally 
meaningful way‖ and considering and dismissing various other arguments). 
 204. See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 
F.3d 1235, 1282, 1313 (11th Cir. 2011) (addressing the commerce power and taxing power 
claims); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 540 (6th Cir. 2011) (addressing 
commerce power claim); Liberty Univ. Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 
WL 3962915, at *5 (4th Cir. 2011) (addressing the tax power claim). 
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stitute an activity that substantially affects interstate com-
merce
205
 and that the federal government cannot compel the pur-
chase of health insurance.
206
 The cases are poised for Supreme 
Court review, with circuit splits on both substantive and proce-
dural grounds. The Eleventh Circuit held the individual mandate 
unconstitutional on both taxing and commerce grounds,
207
 while 
the Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit upheld the mandate as a 
valid exercise of federal commerce power.
208
 The Supreme Court 
almost surely will resolve the merits of the constitutionality of 
the individual mandate during the 2012 term. 
Procedurally, a question in the lower courts was whether states 
have standing to challenge the individual mandate, that is, 
whether states suffer injury-in-fact as a result of the mandate‘s 
operation.
209
 As I noted, the minimum essential coverage re-
quirement does not call for any state implementation or hardly 
any state administration.
210
 In what now seems a strategic mis-
calculation, Virginia, and later Oklahoma,
211
 filed separate law-
suits, apart from the other twenty-six states, asserting standing 
based on the minimum essential coverage provision‘s direct con-
flict with previously enacted state HCFAs.
212
 In essence, those 
states argued unique injuries to their sovereign interest in enforc-
ing validly enacted state laws, which the ACA contravened. In my 
earlier article, I agreed that Virginia would seem to have clearer 
standing to challenge the individual mandate as a violation of 
state sovereignty, as compared to states merely asserting an in-
terest in protecting individual citizens‘ freedom, health, and wel-
 
 205. See Nat‘l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 
(1937) (describing the interstate character of some intrastate activities). 
 206. E.g., Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1285 (summarizing the plaintiffs‘ 
argument); Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 543 (same). 
 207. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. 648 F.3d at 1241. 
 208. Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 534; Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 
2011). 
 209. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (limiting federal courts‘ jurisdiction to ―cases‖ and ―con-
troversies‖); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (listing three re-
quirements for standing, including ―injury in fact‖). 
 210. See supra notes 200–02 and accompanying text (describing operation of individual 
mandate). 
 211. Complaint, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt, supra note 197, at 2. 
 212. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 266 (4th Cir. 2011); Memo-
randum in Support of Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 1, Oklahoma ex rel. 
Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. 6:11-cv-00030-RAW (E.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Memo-
randum, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt]. 
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fare.
213
 My suggestion was echoed by the American Legislative 
Exchange Council‘s (―ALEC‖) playbook, The State Legislators 
Guide to Repealing ObamaCare, urging states to enact HCFAs 
precisely for the purpose of ―provid[ing] standing to a state partic-
ipating in current litigation against the federal individual man-
date.‖
214
  
The Fourth Circuit, however, held just the opposite.
215
 The es-
sence of Virginia‘s claim, according to the court, was ―to litigate 
as parens patriae by asserting the rights of its citizens.‖
216
 The 
court declined to recognize any cognizable state interest in pro-
tecting a state‘s residents from operation of a federal statute.
217
 
Moreover, a state could not ―acquire some special stake in the re-
lationship between its citizens and the federal government mere-
ly by memorializing its litigation posture in a statute.‖
218
 In sum, 
the Fourth Circuit held that the individual mandate implicates 
individual, not state, interests and, accordingly, denied Virginia 
standing to challenge the individual mandate. The U.S. govern-
ment moved to dismiss the Oklahoma case on similar grounds.
219
 
By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit found that case justiciable be-
cause the plaintiffs included both state and private-party plain-
tiffs and the challenges were to both the individual mandate and 
Medicaid expansion.
220
 Virginia‘s go-it-alone strategy, as it turned 
out, was flawed in two respects: first, it fails to include an indi-
vidual litigant with a real stake in the individual health insur-
ance mandate
221
 or a Medicaid challenge, in which the state has a 
 
 213. Leonard, supra note 4, at 159. 
 214. AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, THE STATE LEGISLATORS GUIDE TO REPEALING 
OBAMACARE 12 (2011) [hereinafter ALEC GUIDE]. 
 215. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 272 (holding Virginia had no standing to 
challenge the individual mandate). 
 216. Id. at 268. 
 217. Id. at 270–71; see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Mark A. Hall, Not So Fast—
Jurisdictional Barriers to the ACA Litigation, NEW ENG. J. MED., Oct. 20, 2011, at e34(1)–
e34(2) (noting the Fourth Circuit‘s holding as ―invoking well-settled law that states may 
not sue to protect their citizens from federal law, since state citizens are also federal citi-
zens‖). 
 218. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 271. 
 219. Memorandum, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt, supra note 212, at 8–9. 
 220. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 
1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 221. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 535–36 (6th Cir. 2011) (not-
ing that individual plaintiffs demonstrated actual injury by showing that impending re-
quirements to buy health insurance changed their spending and saving habits). 
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real interest.
222
 Second, Virginia believed that enacting a state 
statute contrary to ACA could create an injury-in-fact where one 
otherwise did not exist. 
In sum, according to at least one federate appellate court, 
states lack standing to challenge the health insurance mandate 
because the real injury is to individuals, not states. On the other 
hand, it is hard to see what interest individuals have in challeng-
ing the mandate on structural federalism grounds. The allegation 
is that Congress acted outside the scope of its limited, enumerat-
ed powers in requiring most Americans to maintain minimum es-
sential health insurance coverage. Such a claim asserts injury to 
states‘ reserved powers, not individual rights. The litigation ap-
proach of individuals challenging the validity of federal laws on 
structural grounds is not unique to the ACA, however.
223
 Affirm-
ing the availability of such a claim, a recent Supreme Court deci-
sion expressly recognized an individual‘s standing to challenge a 
federal statute, not even on a federal enumerated power, but on 
states‘ Tenth Amendment reserved powers,
224
 noting: ―An individ-
ual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the consti-
tutional balance between the National Government and the 
States when the enforcement of those laws causes injury that is 
concrete, particular, and redressable. Fidelity to principles of fed-
eralism is not for the States alone to vindicate.‖
225
 But the strate-
gy does present a paradox. States may lack standing to litigate 
the rights of their citizens while individuals may challenge feder-
al infringement on states‘ rights. 
 
 222. See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1244 (concluding that ―the state 
plaintiffs undeniably have standing to challenge the Medicaid provisions‖). 
 223. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 6–8 (2005) (Commerce Clause challenge to 
Federal Controlled Substances Act raised by users and growers of marijuana); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 604 (2000) (Commerce Clause challenge to Federal Vio-
lence Against Women Act raised by rape defendants); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 551–52 (1995) (Commerce Clause challenge to Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act 
brought by criminal defendant); Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 
919, 923, 928 (1983) (alien sought review of deportation order, challenging Federal Immi-
gration and Nationality Act on separation of powers grounds); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 
397 U.S. 137, 138 (1970) (fruit grower challenged Arizona intrastate packing and pro-
cessing requirement on dormant Commerce Clause grounds). 
 224. Bond v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2360 (2011) (challenging con-
viction under 18 U.S.C. § 229, which forbids knowing possession or use, for nonpeaceful 
purposes, of a chemical that ―can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent 
harm to humans‖) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 225. Id. at 2364. 
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The Supreme Court will not have to reach that procedural co-
nundrum to decide the merits of the individual mandate chal-
lenges because the Florida lawsuit, on which certiorari was 
granted, does not present the standing issue.
 226
 Accordingly, there 
may be no clarification on the question whether states may advo-
cate for individuals‘ rights, consistent with New Federalism liter-
ature,
227
 or whether individuals may advocate for states‘ rights, 
thereby invigorating the Tenth Amendment as an individually 
cognizable claim.
228
 That uncertainty continues to muddle the jus-
ticiable federalism issues.
229
 
2.  State Legislation 
In addition to litigation, states continue to express opposition 
to the individual mandate through state legislation. Lawmakers 
in at least forty-five states have introduced HCFAs or similar 
proposals.
230
 To date, eighteen states have passed binding stat-
utes, as well as two state constitutional amendments, opposing 
elements of the ACA.
231
 Other states will consider resolutions in 
the current legislative term or on 2012 ballot items.
232
 Nine states 
 
 226. See Consolidated Brief for Respondent, Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, Flor-
ida v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-393 & 11-400 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011); 
Reply Brief for Petition, U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (U.S. 
Sept. 28, 2011). 
 227. Leonard, supra note 4, at 130–31 (describing the New Federalism theory as advo-
cating broadened recognition of individual rights by state governments and a shift in pow-
er from the federal government to states). 
 228. See Bond, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2366–67; Garrett Epps, U.S. v. Bond: 
Reexamining the Mysterious 10th Amendment, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www. 
theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/02/us-v-bond-reexamining-the-mysterious-10th-am 
endment/71436/ (suggesting that the case offers ―oblique hints about how the Justices are 
thinking about the pending health-care challenge‖); Frank Mintier, Did the Supreme 
Court Tip Its Hand on ObamaCare?, AM. THINKER (June 23, 2011), http://www.ame rican-
thinker.com/2011/06/did-the-supreme-court-tip-its-hand-on-obamacare.html (quoting Jus-
tice Kennedy‘s question during the Bond argument and suggesting it foreshadows ―how he 
might rule on ObamaCare‖). But see Adam Liptak, Court Weighs the Power of Congress, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2011, at A11 (suggesting that unique facts of Bond ―offer[s] only lim-
ited guidance on the health care law‘s prospects‖). 
 229. See generally Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Affordable Care Act Litigation: The 
Standing Paradox, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988311 (describing lower court decisions in ACA litiga-
tion and proposing that states be accorded standing to challenge the individual mandate, 
if they allege concrete, particularized injury to state interests, similar to individual plain-
tiffs‘ injury allegations). 
 230. Cauchi, supra note 25. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
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passed nonbinding resolutions or memorials.
233
 In 2011, the year 
after the ACA was finally and validly enacted as federal law, 
eight additional states introduced legislation purporting to shield 
their residents from the ACA‘s requirement to maintain mini-
mum essential health insurance coverage.
234
 
The ongoing state legislative activity in the face of obvious fed-
eral preemption is curious. Urging states to continue enacting 
HCFAs, ALEC‘s playbook suggests, among other strategic effects, 
that the HCFAs ―provide a state-level defense against Obama-
Care‘s excessive federal power‖ and could support ―additional, 
[Tenth]-Amendment-based litigation if the current lawsuits 
fail.‖
235
 It is not clear what sort of state-level defense an obviously 
preempted state law might have, or how a Tenth Amendment 
challenge would fare any better than a challenge to the scope of 
particular enumerated federal powers.
236
 More realistically, 
HCFAs may simply memorialize states opinions about individual 
rights and codify objection to federal health reform. It is also pos-
sible that HCFAs would reemerge as enforceable state laws, 
should the ACA in its entirety, or the individual mandate, specifi-
cally, be struck down.
237
 
Even more curious is states‘ novel strategy of enacting the ―In-
terstate Health Care Freedom Compact‖ (the ―Compact‖).
238
 The 
Compact includes elements of individual states‘ HCFAs but pur-
ports to operate as an agreement among states to resist federal 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. See id. 
 235. ALEC GUIDE, supra note 214, at 12. 
 236. The issue whether the Tenth Amendment operates as an additional limit on fed-
eral power is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (―The [Tenth] [A]mendment states but a truism that all is retained 
which has not been surrendered.‖); Kurt T. Lash, James Madison’s Celebrated Report of 
1800: The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 167–69 
(2006) (―Over a period of two hundred years, courts and commentators thus transformed 
the Tenth Amendment from a declaration of principle to an independent rule of construc-
tion.‖); Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth [A]mendment in Constitutional 
Context, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 470, 472 (2008) (examining the interaction between 
the Tenth Amendment and federal laws). 
 237. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 166. 
 238. Some States Pursue Health Compacts, supra note 199. See generally HEALTH CARE 
COMPACT, http://healthcarecompact.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter HEALTH 
CARE COMPACT] (―The Health Care Compact is an interstate compact—which is simply an 
agreement between two or more states that is consented to by Congress—that restores 
authority and responsibility for health care regulation to the member states . . . and pro-
vides the funds to the state to fulfill that responsibility.‖). 
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health reform. Three litigant states Texas,
239
 Oklahoma,
240
 and 
Georgia,
241
 and one non-litigant state, Missouri
242
 have enacted the 
Compact under state laws. The Compact legislation has also been 
introduced in at least fourteen other states.
243
 Proponents and 
sponsors describe the Compact as ―giv[ing] the health care deci-
sion making power back to the people instead of the bureaucrats 
in Washington,‖
244
 ―[p]reserving [Tenth] Amendment rights so 
states can move forward with true health care reform,‖
245
 and al-
lowing ―each state [to] decide[] which plan is best for its citi-
zens.‖
246
 They further assert that compacts are neither ―radical‖ 
nor unprecedented but simply ―tools to allow states to solve prob-
lems together.‖
247
 Broadly, Compact authorizes member states to 
―suspend by legislation the operation of all federal laws, rules, 
regulations, and orders regarding Health Care that are incon-
sistent with the laws and regulations adopted by the Member 
State pursuant to this Compact.‖
248
 Further, the Compact pur-
ports to entitle states to receive federal block grants and prohibits 
such funding from being ―conditional on any action of or regula-
tion, policy, law, or rule being adopted by the Member State.‖
249
 
 
 239. Chuck Lindell, Changes in Healthcare Sent to Perry, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, 
June 28, 2011, at B1 (discussing Senate Bill 7, including provisions that ―would allow Tex-
as to join a developing interstate health care compact‖). 
 240. Patrick B. McGuigan, Texas Joins Missouri, Oklahoma, and Georgia in Historic 
Health Care Compact, TULSA TODAY (July 19, 2011), http://www.tulsatoday.com/index.php 
?option=com_content&view=article&id=2732 (noting that Texas joined Missouri, Oklaho-
ma, and Georgia). 
 241. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-48-1 (2011); see Press Release, Ga. Senate Press Office, 
Health Care Compacts Heads to Governor‘s Desk in Georgia (Apr. 18, 2011), available at 
http://senatepress.net/health-care-compact-heads-to-governors-desk-in-georgia.html. 
 242. Missouri Enacts Health Care Compact, COLUM. MISSOURIAN (July 14, 2011), http: 
//www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2011/07/14/mo-enacts-states-health-care-compact/. 
 243. See Guy Gugliotta, Some States Seeking Health-Care Compact, WASH. POST, Sept. 
18, 2011, at A6. 
 244. Press Release, Ga. Senate Press Office, supra note 241 (quoting Eric O‘Keefe, 
Chairman of the Health Compact Alliance) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 245. Id. (quoting Georgia State Senator Charlie Bethel) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 246. Leo Linbeck & Eric O. O‘Keefe, Op-Ed, Health Care Compact Among States Is the 
Alternative to Obamacare, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 22, 2011), http://washingtonexaminer. 
com/opinion/op-eds/2011/03/health-care-compact-among-states-alternative-obamacare (ex-
pressing the opinions of the vice chairman and chairman of Health Care Compact Alli-
ance). 
 247. Lois Kolkhorst, Compacts Empower States to Decide Health Care Issues, HOUST. 
CHRON., July 30, 2011, at B7. 
 248. H.B. 5, 82d Leg., 1st Called Sess. (Tex. 2011); see also S.B. 7, 82d Leg., 1st Called 
Sess. (Tex. 2011). 
 249. Tex. H.B. 5; see also Lindell, supra note 239 (describing Tex. S.B. 7, including the 
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The Texas Compact legislation asserts that the interstate Com-
pact is a way to move control from the federal government to the 
states but acknowledges that the Compact is subject to congres-
sional approval before it is enforceable.
250
 
The ostensible authority for interstate compacts comes from 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution, providing that ―[n]o State shall, 
without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or 
Compact with another State.‖
251
 The converse suggestion is that 
with congressional consent, states may enter compacts with one 
another. Health Care Freedom Compact sponsors interpret that 
constitutional provision as a stealth weapon in the fight against 
federal health reform. Missouri State Representative Eric Burli-
son suggested that the ―very same article in the Constitution 
[that] has been used for the federal government to grow its pow-
ers for many decades‖ can be used, instead, as ―a very polite way 
[to] ask the federal government to give our authority back.‖
252
 
The states‘ attempted reliance on the Compact Clause to band 
together in opposition of federal law is unprecedented and likely 
futile. While there is precedent for interstate compacts—over 100 
have received congressional approval—they generally address 
cross-border problems such as transportation, water rights, driv-
ers‘ licenses, and runaway juveniles.
253
 In the health care context, 
states previously enacted interstate compacts allowing the trans-
fer of institutionalized patients to ensure appropriate follow-up 
 
compact provision, ―which would let Texas distribute its Medicaid, Medicare and children‘s 
health insurance money as a federal block grant‖). 
 250. Tex. H.B. 5. 
 251. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 252. Stephen Dinan, State Compacts on Health Care Eyed as End Run Around Obama, 
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2011, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 253. See, e.g., Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980) 
(uncodified); Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 66800–66801 (West 
2009 & Cum. Supp. 2012); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519–20 (1893) (upholding 
boundary line established by 1803 compact between Virginia and Tennessee); Dinan, su-
pra note 252 (suggesting that more than 100 compacts have passed); Kolkhorst, supra 
note 247 (listing examples and suggesting that more than 200 compacts are currently in 
operation). See generally Herbert H. Naujoks, Compacts and Agreements Between States 
and Between States and a Foreign Power, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 219, 224 (1953) (providing a 
list of areas in which compacts have been used); George William Sherk, The Management 
of Interstate Water Conflicts in the Twenty-First Century: Is It Time to Call Uncle?, 12 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 764, 766–67 (2005) (―There is no doubt that the framers of the Consti-
tution expected the states to resolve conflicts among themselves through the use of inter-
state compacts.‖). 
LEONARD 463 MASTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/2012  1:08 PM 
2012] STATE CHALLENGES TO ACA IMPLEMENTATION 819 
care.
254
 Without question, interstate compacts must be approved 
by Congress to have any legal force and effect.
255
 Any disputes 
among states arising under interstate compacts fall within the 
Supreme Court‘s original jurisdiction.
256
 Accordingly, it is incon-
ceivable that Congress, having passed the ACA barely two years 
ago, with Supreme Court review pending, would approve an in-
terstate compact among states excusing themselves from compli-
ance with the ACA and granting themselves open-ended, no-
strings-attached federal funding.
257
 The question, then, is whether 
the Compact sponsors fail to appreciate the futility of their ac-
tions, or whether they envision the compact as yet one more way 
to signal objection to the ACA. 
State-based dissent to the individual mandate has taken two 
rather different paths. First, seemingly novel judicial challenges 
that are now deemed worthy of consideration by the highest 
Court in the land. Second, a variety of state legislative enact-
ments and proposals of dubious legal merit. In both cases, objec-
tion to the mandate is framed as states‘ rights, but the essential 
contention is infringement on personal autonomy. Because the 
individual rights claims are weak, structural federalism argu-
ments are doing the heavy lifting of bringing (and keeping) the 
issue to the public fore.
258
 Skeptics dismiss federalism objections 
to the individual mandate as ―opportunistic‖ fronts for substan-
 
 254. E.g., Interstate Compact on Mental Health, GA. CODE ANN. § 37-10-2 (2011). 
 255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; Naujoks, supra note 253, at 225 (distinguishing 
compacts subject to congressional approval from agreements among states that do not al-
ter the political power of the affected states, which do not require congressional consent); 
Sherk, supra note 253, at 766–67 & n.7 (discussing the congressional consent requirement 
relating to interstate water conflicts); Dinan, supra note 252 (quoting UCLA Law Profes-
sor, Adam Winkler, as noting that compacts need congressional consent); Sam Baker, 
Healthcare “Compact” Advances in Two States, THE HILL (May 18, 2011), http://thehill. 
com/blogs/healthwatch/state-issues/162015-healthcare-compact-advances-in-2-states (―[I]n 
order to take effect and supersede federal law, an interstate compact needs Congress‘s 
stamp of approval.‖). 
 256. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the Court has original jurisdiction 
―[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be a Party‖); e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 126 (1987); Jona-
than Horne, On Not Resolving Interstate Disputes, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 95, 98, 147 
(2011). 
 257. See Dinan, supra note 252 (quoting Professor Winkler as stating that ―it doesn‘t 
seem likely you can get a bill through the House and Senate and have it signed by Presi-
dent Obama that exempts states from what is President Obama‘s signature achievement‖) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Gugliotta, supra note 242 (Montana Democratic Gov. 
Brian Schweitzer, who vetoed that state‘s compact bill, stated that ‗―we will put a person 
on Neptune‘ before Congress approves the compact‖). 
 258. See Moncrieff, supra note 203 (manuscript at 2). 
LEONARD 463 MASTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/2012  1:08 PM 
820 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:781 
tive objections to the individual mandate, specifically, and federal 
health reform, generally.
259
 
There is no doubt that libertarian, anti-Obama, partisan oppo-
sition fuels the health reform debate. Nevertheless, this essay 
aims to rebut the reductionist spin on the debate by considering 
the individual mandate opposition within the larger context of 
state resistance to ACA implementation. Although the individual 
mandate has garnered the most attention, several other ACA 
provisions bearing on federal-state allocation of power are also 
targets of resistance. States balk at increased burdens under 
Medicaid, hesitate to embark on new cooperative arrangements 
with the federal government under the PCIP and exchanges, and 
resist at least certain federal health insurance regulations. More-
over, the Supreme Court‘s willingness to consider the individual 
mandate challenge as presented and briefed by twenty-six state 
plaintiffs,
260
 and to hear both state and individual challenges to 
the federal-state cooperative Medicaid program,
261
 amply demon-
strates that the federalism arguments are more than rhetorical. 
The outcome of those cases and the ongoing ACA implementation 
process will, without question, affirm, clarify, and perhaps alter 
the allocation of power between states and the federal govern-
ment. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
To conclude, I reconsider rhetorical federalism and find the 
values
262
 still tenable two years post-ACA enactment.  The values 
of rhetorical federalism include bringing transparency to the task 
of implementing comprehensive laws, educating the electorate by 
distilling the law to discrete issues, giving voice to minority 
views, depoliticizing highly charged issues, codifying dissent, and 
 
 259. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 125–28 (describing ―opportunistic federalism‖). 
 260. See U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398, ___ U.S. ___, 
2011 WL 5515164 at *1 (Nov. 14, 2011); Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393,  
___ U.S. ___, 2011 WL 5515162 at *1 (Nov. 14, 2011) (consolidating case with Florida v. 
U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs. No. 11-400, ___ U.S. ___, 2011 WL 5515165 (Nov. 14, 
2011). 
 261. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1262–68 (rejecting the Medicaid chal-
lenge); see Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 992 (2011) 
(consolidating case with Maxwell-Jolly v. Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 922 (2011) 
and Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Mem’l Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 996 (2011)). 
 262. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 161–68. 
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highlighting the increased role of government in health care de-
livery. 
Continued state resistance to the ACA certainly highlights the 
complexity of implementing a comprehensive overhaul of the U.S. 
health care system. Discussions over Medicaid, the PCIP, and ex-
changes reveal the necessary, if at times acrimonious, involve-
ment of both federal and state lawmakers and regulators to carry 
out those functions. States may be criticized for using the imple-
mentation process to perpetuate partisan fights over health re-
form. But the strategy of staging objections to discrete provisions 
as they roll out over the next several years does have the effect of 
parsing the massive package of reforms. As opinion surveys re-
veal, the public may disfavor the federal health reform law as a 
broad concept while actually supporting many particular provi-
sions.
263
 
Health insurance market regulations, which the public gener-
ally supports, and the individual mandate, which remains highly 
contested, both reveal the increased role of government in the 
health care system. I previously suggested that such awareness 
could provide a platform for public consideration of more sweep-
ing reform, such as a single-payor system. While the public seems 
anything but ready to embrace a universal, government health 
care program, we are more aware of the tradeoffs. The validity of 
the individual mandate, by the federal government‘s own admis-
sion, turns on the complex interrelationship of that requirement 
with the ACA‘s guaranteed issue and community rating provi-
sions.
264
 The individual mandate debate may help ACA opponents 
further appreciate that they cannot have the sweet of insurance 
market reforms without the bitter of the individual mandate. 
Other suggested values of rhetorical federalism are harder to 
gauge. One, giving voice to minority views, still seems true in 
theory but is less evident in fact. The 2010 midterm elections 
shifted the balance of power in the U.S. House of Representatives 
to Republicans, and the 2012 presidential election could go to ei-
ther party. In late 2011, more Americans, and notably more Dem-
ocrats, expressed a negative view about the law than supported 
 
 263. See supra note 163 (citing the KFF survey and other sources). 
 264. See Brief for Appellant at 28–32, Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of 
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-11021 and 11-1107). 
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it.
265
 Thus, health reform opposition may no longer be the minori-
ty view. The expressive function of state HCFAs, compacts, litiga-
tion, and implementation moratoria may have contributed to that 
opinion shift. If increased understanding of the law and time to 
carefully consider its effects have caused support to dwindle, that 
may simply be the political process at work rather than any dis-
ingenuous conduct by states. Another value of rhetorical federal-
ism is codifying dissent. Even apparently unenforceable state 
laws and interstate compacts may memorialize state preferences, 
thus providing a jumping off point for future debate,
266
 should the 
new presidential administration or Congress move to repeal the 
ACA in whole or in part. 
Where I most clearly missed the mark in identifying values of 
rhetorical federalism was my suggestion that structural argu-
ments over federal health reform could depoliticize the highly 
charged partisan debate. Clearly, in the current environment, 
that is anything but true. The issue of the proper scope of federal 
power vis-à-vis the states has become the central, signature issue 
of ACA opposition. Supreme Court resolution of those questions 
could usher in a new era of federal-state relations. Even if the 
state-based dissent to the ACA began as an opportunistic federal-
ism strategy to oppose the substantive policies of health reform, 
the rhetoric has gained a firm foothold and will leave an indelible 
mark. 
 
 
 265. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUBLIC OPINION ON HEALTH CARE ISSUES 3 
(2011). 
 266. See supra Part III.E.2 (describing state legislative activity, post-ACA enactment). 
